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tion of Woolworth, significantly reveals Maryland's future posture in 
the area of respondeat superior. The absolute liability of the master 
seems to be an inevitable result. 
Barry Genkin 
CRIMINAL LAW-JUDICIAL AFFIRMANCE OF THE VALIDITY 
OF THE YEAR AND A DAY RULE IN MARYLAND. STATE V. 
BROWN, 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974). 
A mortal wound rarely claiJDs its victim more than a year after the 
fatal infliction. The common law established the rule that, in order to 
constitute felonious homicide, death of the victim must occur within a 
year and a day after the fatal act. 
In State v. Brown,l a case of first impression, the Court of Special 
Appeals addressed itself to the applicability of the year and a day rule 
in Maryland. The appellee was indicted for the murder of his wife. It . 
was not disputed that the decedent, who lingered almost two years 
before she died, was injured by the appellee.2 The Criminal Court of 
Baltimore, in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment, 
found the year and a day rule to be valid and viable in Maryland. Upon 
appeal by the State, the Court of Special Appeals, in affirming the trial 
court's decision, held that the year and a day rule is in "full force and . 
effect in Maryland.,,3 Although the Brown court recognized the ad-
vancements made by medical science, it was not prepared to conclude 
that the rule is presently anachronistic.4 Adjudging any alteration of 
the rule by judicial discretion inappropriate, the court reasoned that if 
change in the rule was to occur, it should be by the General Assembly.s 
The rule is not intended to be a statute of limitations on an 
indictment for felonious homicide.6 It is a test of proXimate causation 
1. 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974). 
2. Appellee had. pleaded guilty to assault with intent to murder and was subsequently sen-
tenced to a six-year prison term notwithstanding the fact that the State had recom-
mended a five-year sentence. Brief for Appellant at 2. 
3. 21 Md. App. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. The State, in its brief, had not disputed the validity 
of the common law rule in Maryland but had urged abrogation of the rule. Brief for 
Appellant at 2. . 
4. Id. See also notes 63-65 infra. 
5. Id. See also note 62 infra. 
6. A statute of limitations connotes the time in which a prosecution can be brought after 
the completion of the crime, which, in the case or'murder, does not commence until the 
death of the victim. Because the overwhelming majority of states do not limit prosecution 
for murder, prosecution may be brought at any time during the life of the offender. See, 
e.g., GAo CODE ANN. § 26-502 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(1) (Supp. 1972). 
Contra, N.M .. STAT. ANN. § 4OA-I-8 (1953), no person shall be prosecuted for a capital 
felony unless an indictment can be found, information or complaint filed within ten years 
from the time the crime is committed. A number of states do limit the prosecution period 
for felonies other than murder. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.11 (1974), prosecution for 
all felonies other than aggravated murder or murder is barred unless commenced within 
six years after the offense. 
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which concludes that "if [the victim] died after [a year and a"day] it 
cannot be discerned, as the law presumes, whether he died of the stroke 
or poison, etc., or a natural death, and in the case of life, the law ought 
to be certain.,,7 The rule created arbitrary settlement for the difficult 
question of proof of physical causation. The difficulty of proof was 
attributed to two factors. First, at early common law, the science of 
medicine was relatively primitive, not having advanced to the point 
where death from a particular cause could be conclusively determined. 
Second, the testimony of expert witnesses was unknown to the trier of 
facts in the early English courts.8 The jury could only base its deter-
mination of causation upon the conclusions of fact and persuasive 
assertions.9 One of the more arbitrary features of the rule was the 
tacking on of an additional day to the year. The early English law gave 
no recognition to fractions of days; a day was conveniently added so 
that a whole year would have elapsed after the fatal stroke.1 0 
Three forms of actions dealing with murder and manslaughter existed 
at common law. 1 1 An important element in each form of action was 
death "within a year and a day. The earliest mentioned action within 
English common law appears to be the "appeals of death."1 2 Essen-
tially a private prosecution for the punishment of public crimes, the 
action placed the feud in the hands of the male nearest in blood to the 
decedent.1 3 The action provided that if the victim died within a year 
and a day after the assault, the "appeal of death" should not be 
abated.1 4 Reasoning that personal vengence should be promptly ex-
7. 3 E. COKE, INSTlTtJ'I"FJI 53 (2d ed. 1648) [hereinaftet cited as COKE). 
8. 10 WISC. L. REV. 112, 113 (1934). 
9. J. THAYER, EVIDENCE 174 (1898). 
10. 3 COKE 53. 
11. See Louisville, E. & St. L. RR v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) for a full analysis of the 
three forms of action in early English common law dealing with murder and manslaughter. 
See also Brown v. State, 21 Md. App. 91, 94 n.4, 318 A.2d 257, 25!Hi0 n.4, and in particular 
the second paragraph where the court recites other aspects of ancient law where the 
limitation appeared. 
12. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *312-13 [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE1 described 
the origin of appeals of death as a Germanic custom by which pecuniary satisfaction·was 
paid to the injured party or his relatives by the assailant. See also 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAIT-
LAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 39 (Milson ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK 
& MAITLAND). 
13. 4 BLACKSTONE *312-13. 
14. Statute of Glouchester of 1278, 6 Edw. I, c. 9: 
The King commandeth that no Writ shall be granted out of the Chancery for 
the Death of a Man to enquire whether a Man did kill another by Misfortune, or 
in his own Defence, or in other Manner without Felony; (2) but he shall be put in 
Prison until the coming of the Justices in Eyre, or Justices assigned to the Goal-
delivery, and shall put himself"upon the County before them for Good and Evil: 
(3) In case it be found by the Country, that he did it in his Defence, or by Mis-
fortune, then by the Report of the Justices to the King, the King shall take him 
to his Grace, if it piease him. (4) It is provided also, that no Appeal shall be abated 
so soon as they have been heretofore; but if the Appellor declare the Deed. the 
Year, the Day, the Hours, the Time of the King, and the Town where the Deed 
was done and with what Weapon he was slain, the Appeal shall stand in Effect, 
(5) and shall not be abated for Default of fresh Suit, if the Party shall sue within the 
Year and aDay after the Deed done. 
188 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 4 
ecuted, the statute was misinterpreted as requiring that the private 
appeal be initiated within a year and a day after the victim's death and 
not after infliction of the mortal wound. Thus, the statute was, in 
effect, one of limitation.1 5 Albeit, through transition or ignorance, the 
year and a day limitation evolved from its origins in private appeal 
prosecutions into a substantial element of criminal homicide.1 6 
A second method, "inquisitions against deodands," like "appeals of 
death," was essentially a criminal action even though civil in some 
procedural aspects. It was an action of· forfeiture, whereby the party. 
committing the injury forfeited to the king personal chattels used in 
making his assault.1 7 The forfeited chattels were to be applied to pious 
uses including the distributioJl of alms.18 However, if the assaulted 
party lingered more than a year and a day, there arose a conclusive 
presumption that death had resulted from an independent cause pre-
cluding institution of the forfeiture action.1 9 
The advent of "public prosecution" established the foundations for 
the third form of action. Brought in the name of, and on behalf of, the 
king, the action recognized that criminal offenses were essentially 
indignities against the public peace, not personal wrongs against the 
victim.20 As modem criminal prosecution evolved, the "appeal of 
death" disappeared.2 1 Thus, the rule that no one could be held respon-
sible for a felonious homicide when more than a year and a day elapsed 
between infliction of the mortal wound and death was fmnly settled in 
the common law of England.2 2 
. The rule was eventually adopted in the United States. With only two 
15. The confusion as to whether the time was to run from the date of the blow or from the 
date of the victim's death was witnessed in Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 631 (King's Bench 
1558). The court's holding that the time ran from the date of death has served as a primary 
authority that the rule was by nature a limitation. See also 4 BLACKSTONE ·315. 
16. See 19 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 181 (1941) for an exhaustive treatment of the transition of the 
statute from a form of limitation to an element of criminal homicide. 
17. 1. BLACKSTONE ·300. The concept was derived from the legal fiction that the inanimate ob-
ject used in making the assault was guilty of a wrong doing. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 473. A 
contemporary analogy will be found in automobile forfeiture statutes which authorize con· 
fiscation by the state of motor vehicles used to transport or conceal narcotics. MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 'l:l § 297 (1970). See generally 3 U. BALT. L. REV. 270 (1974). 
18. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND 474. This original charitable purpOlle was eventually abused when 
the king granted the properties 80 obtained to his favorites. 1 BLACKSTONE ·301. 
19. 1 W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 75-76 (8th Curwood ed. 1824). The inquisitions 
against deodands were abolished by statute in England in 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62. 
(1846). 
20. 2 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 256-57 (4th ed. 1936). 
21. The appeal was abolished by statute in England in 1819, 39 Geo. m. c. 46, and never 
existed as a method of trial in the United States. 
22. Louisville, E. St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) (dictum); Commonwealth v. 
Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 175, 166 A.2d 501,507 (1960) (concurring opinion); 3 COKE 47. Though 
usually' phrased in terms of murder, the common law rule was reasserted to apply with 
equal force to manslaughter. Rex v. Dyson, (1908) 2 K.B. 254; cf. Commonwealth v. 
Evaul, 5 Pa. D. & C. 105 (Phil. Co. Ct. 1924) (rule does not apply to involuntary manslaugh· 
ter) .. 
1974] Recent Developments 189 
exceptions,23 those courts which have considered the question have 
detennined that the rule prevails.24 Although acknowledging the rule's 
existence, the decisions of those same courts occasioned sharp judicial 
conflict as to the precise nature of the rule. The struggle centered on 
whether the rule was substantive or evidentiary in nature.2S Those 
jurisdictions treating the rule as evidentiary conclusively presumed that 
if a year and a day elapsed prior to death; it resulted from other causes 
and no evidence was admissible.26 Those jurisdictions fmding the rule 
to be substantive reasoned that no felonious homicide was chargeable if 
death failed to occur within the time proscribed by the rule.2 7 Not-
withstanding the fact that the rule was approached by two different 
avenues of thought, every jurisdiction, with the two exceptions stated 
above, reached the conclusion that the rule was valid.2 8 
The fIrSt judicial exception occurred in People v. Legeri, 2 9 a 1933 
lower court decision in New York. The Legeri court held that, while the 
rule was a substantive element of common law felonious homicide, the 
New York Penal Law and Code had implicitly abrogated all common 
law crimes.3 0 In its stead, the New York Penal Law and Code was to 
serve as a complete compjJation and definition of all crimes. Since no 
reference to the year and a day rule was included in the statutory 
definition of murder, the court concluded that the intention of the 
legislature was the abolition of the rule.31 The Legeri court further 
23. People,v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934); People v. Legeri, 239 App. Div. 
47,266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933); Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1961). 
24. See, e.g., Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State v. Dailey, 191 Ind. 
678, 134 N.E. 481 (1922); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). See 
generally Annot., 93 A.L.R 1470 (1934); Annot., 20 A.L.R 1006 (1922). 
25. The procedural view was essentially discarded. See, e.g., Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 
118 (1890), an indictment, failing to show that the date of death oc~d within a year 
and a day, was no longer fatally defective if brought within that time. But ct. State v. 
Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684, 243 P. 854 (1926). As to where silence is not deemed a fault see 
People '1. Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 (1870), rule is evidentiary, not proced\lll!l; Smith v. State, 
72 Fla. 449, 73 So. 354 (1916), objection coming after the trial was too· late; Jane v. Com-
monwealth, 60 Ky. Rep. (3 Met.) 18 (1860),. allegation of death regarded as unnecessary. 
It should be noted that in many cases which discuss the evidentiary or substantive na-
ture of the rule, the issue actually before the court was whether or not the State's indict-
ment sufficiently stated a cause of action. Debate on the nature of the rule was mere 
dictum. 
26. See, e.g., Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 (1894) (dictum); People v. 
Murphy, 39 Cal. 52 (1870); Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); State 
v. Heff, 11 Nev. 17 (1876). 
27. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 196 La. 617, 199 So. 661 (1940); People v. Brengard, 265 N.Y. 
100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934) (dictum); State v. Spadoni, 137 Wash. 684, 243 P. 854 (1926). 
28. See note 24 supra. See also Commonwealth v. Macloon, J01 Mass. 1. 100 Am. Dec. 89 
(1869); State v. Orrell, 12 N.C. (1 Dev. L.) 139, 17 Am. Dec. 563 (1836); Edmondson v. 
State, 41 Tex. 496 (1874). . 
29. 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933). 
30. Id. at 48,266 N.Y.S. at 87. 
31. To aid the Legeri court in ascertaining legislative intent, reference was made to statutes 
existing prior to the adoption of the NEW YORK PENAL LAW AND CODE which had in-
corporated the year and a day rule. For e~mple, by the Law of February 14, 1787. ch. 
22 (1787] willful killing by poison was deemed premeditated murder. H death did not 
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buttressed its decision by noting the inapplicability of the rule in light 
of medical advancements.32 The following year, the New York Court 
of Appeals in People v. Brengard3 3 became the first state court of last 
resort to determine that the common law rule was an anachronism.3 4 
More then twenty-five years elapsed before occurrence of the next 
judicial exception. In 1961, Maryland's sister state of Pennsylvania 
abolished the rule with its decision in Commonwealth v. Ladd. 3 5 The 
court reasoned that if the rule was evidentiary rather than substantive 
in nature, it was subject to judicial abolition.3 6 In reaching its decision, 
the Ladd court relied upon Blackstone's definition of murder. "A 
felonious homicide occurs when a person of sound memory and discre-
tion unlawfully and feloniously kills any human being in the peace of 
the sovereign with malice prepense or aforethought. ,,3 7 Blackstone did 
not refer to the year and a day rule until two pages later. "In order 
also to make the killing murder it is requisite that the party die within a 
year and a day after the stroke received or cause of death adminis-
tered.,,38 The court reasoned that since Blackstone had deliberately 
not mentioned the rule until after two intervening pages, Blackstone 
did not consider the rule substantive. Finding the rule to be arbitrary 
and taking judicial notice of medical advances, the Ladd court saw no 
more reason for reading Blackstone's addendum into his substantive 
definition of murder than for considering a rule of venue as part of the 
substantive definition.39 The rule was evidentiary and thus subject to 
judicial abolition.4 0 
It was within this historical and judicial context that the court in 
State v. Brown4 1 was confronted with the validity and viability of the 
ensue within the year and a day under the Law of February lO, 1813, ch. 29 [1813] when 
there was an intent to murder by poisoning, punishment could not exceed a 14-year prison 
term. The Legeri court reasoned that, since prior statutes had specifically incorporated 
the rule, repeal of such statutes in 1828 and the Legislature's subsequent failure to in-
clude the rule when enacting the PENAL LAW AND GODE indicated the Legislature's intent 
to abrogate the rule. 239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933). 
32. 239 App. Div. at 49, 266 N.Y.S. at 88. 
33. 265 N.Y. 100, 191 N.E. 850 (1934). 
34. For discussion provoked by these cases see, e.g., 10 WISC. L. REV. 112 (1934); 19 MINN. 
L. REV. 240 (1935); 19 CORNELL. L. Q. 306 (1934). 
35. 402 Pa. 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1960). 
36.Id. 
37. 4 BLACKSTONE *195; 402 Pa. at 172, 166 A.2d at 505. 
38. 4 BLACKSTONE *197; 402 Pa. at 172, 166 A.2d at 505. 
39. 402 Pa. at 172, 166 A.2d at 505-06. 
40. In finding the rule to be evidentiary, rather than substantive, the Ladd court relied upon 
the dictum of the Supreme Court case of Louisville, E. & St. L. R.R. v. Clarke, 152 U.S. 230 
(1894). The concurring opinion in Ladd, while finding the rule to be part of the substantive 
English common law, determined that the rule had never been adopted into PennAyl-
vania's common law. A vigorous dissent attacked the majority's analysis of Blackstone, 
found the rule valid in Pennsylvania, and challenged the majority's arbitrary rewriting of 
the criminal law as a "despotic untrammeled usurpation of power ... taking away COD-
stitutional prerogatives ... [and] making a mockery of the law of cause and effect." 
402 Pa. at 201, 166 A.2d at 520. The Ladd decision aroused extensive comment and criti-
cism. See, e.g., 65 DICK. L. REv. 166 (1961); 40 N.C. L. REv. 327 (1962); 47 VA. L. REv. 
880 (1961). 
41. 21 Md. App. 91,318 A.2d 257 (1974). 
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year and a day rule in Maryland. The court, after considering the rule's 
historical derivation, its apparent arbitrary nature, and the rationale for 
its existence, concluded that, "[i) t follows from what we have said 
that, although there does not appear to be a case in this jurisdiction 
applying the common law rule, we think that it is in full force and 
effect· in Maryland.,,4 2 The court relied upon the interpretation of 
Maryland's Declaration of Rights: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common 
law of England, ... according to the course of that Law, ... as 
existed on the Fourth day of July, seventeen hundred and 
seventy-six; and which, by experience, have been found applica-
ble to their local and other circumstances, and have been 
introduced, used and practiced by the Court of Law or 
Equity.43 
The principle Maryland case construing Article 5 of the Declaration 
of Rights was State v. Buchanan,4 4 where the court interpreted the 
Article as supportive of English common law "except such portions of 
it as are inconsistent with the spirit of that instrument, and the nature 
of our new political institutions.,,4 5 The Brown court, following the 
lead of the Criminal Court, did not question the validity of either 
condition precedent for adoption of the year and a day rule into the 
Maryland common law.46 The court concluded that the rule "has had 
overwhelming support in the United States.'''' 7 
Although the Brown court sustained the existence of the rule in 
Maryland common law, it discussed the precise nature of the rule only 
indirectly. The court simply stated that the "law will not recognize a 
homicide'''' 8 when the victim lingers more than a year and a day. While 
42. [d. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. The court said that the rule was promulgated by judicial de-
cisions, but inaccurately cited the Supreme Court case of Louisville, E. & St. L. RR. v. 
Clarke, 152 U.S, 230 (1894), as recognizing the rule when in fact recognition occurred only in 
dictum. 21 Md. App. at 95, 318 A.2d at 260. The Maryland appellate cases of State v. 
Hamilton, 14 Md. App. 582, 587 n.10, 287 A.2d 791, 794 n.10 (1972) and Whitehead v. 
State, 9 Md. App. 7, 9 n.2, 262 A.2d 316, 318 n.2 (1970) support the existence of the year 
and a day rule in Maryland by way of obiter dictum. 21 Md. App. at 97 n.8, 318 A.2d at 
261 n.8. 
43. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights art. 5. Article 5 "appeared fmt as Section m of the 
Declaration of Rights in the Constitution of 1776, as Article 3 in the Declaration of Rights 
of the Constitution of 1851, and as Article 4 of the Declaration of Rights in the Constitu-
tion of 1864." Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 513, 74 A.2d 36,38 (1950). 
44. 5 Har. & J. 317 (1821). 
45. [d. at 358. Whether particular parts of the common law are applicable to our local cir-
cumstances and political institutions is a question for the courts to decide. [d. 
46. On July 4, 1776 the rule existed in England. If an English common law rule did not conflict 
with the Maryland Constitution or contemporaneous ooliticai institutions, adoption of the 
rule occurred. It should be noted that the State, in its brief, stipulated that the common 
law rule was in force il) MarYland. See note 3 supra; ct. Commonwealth v. Ladd, 402 PL 
164, 175-85, 166 A.2d 501, 507-12 (concurring opinion). . 
47. 21 Md. App. at 95, 318 A.2d at 260. While the Maryland appellate courts are under no ob-
ligation to follow majority views, neither are they under any obligation to expound a POSI-
tion contrary to that majority which has passed upon an issue. Association of Independent 
Taxi Operators, Inc. v. Yellow Cab Co., 198 Md. 181, 204-05,82 A.2d 106, 117 (1951). 
48. 21 Md. App. at 92, 318 A.2d at 258. See also id. at 99, 318 A.2d at 262. The implication 
192 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 4 
the court implied that the rule should be considered a substantive 
element of common law felonious homicide rather than an evidentiary 
rule, it did not reach a definite conclusion,49 noting that the cases in 
other jurisdictions are equally divided in declaring the rule to be 
substantive or evidentiary. 5 0 
Some advantages flow from the court's failure to articulate a stance 
on the rule's precise nature. First, it allows the rule to be both 
substantive and evidentiary. The soundest reasoning for this view ap-
pears in the recent case of Elliott v. Mills. 5 1 The court, having deter-
mined that in a criminal act death within a year and a day must be both 
pleaded (by indictment) and proved, termed the rule as both substan-
tive and evidentiary. However, the Elliott court's approach would seem 
to suggest that the rule is actually substantive since the court incorpor-
ated the rule as an essential element which must be pleaded and 
proved.s 2 Second, extended discussion of the nature of the rule may 
obscure the principle issue. When a valid common law rule, whether 
substantive or evidentiary, has been adopted, the vital controversy 
should center on whether authority for abrogation or amendment 
properly belongs to the legislature or the judiciary. Such a determina-
tion falls into one of the gray areas of law. Indeed, on occasion and 
without doing violence to the Constitution, the judiciary may, in its 
discretion "legislate;" however, indiscriminate or unjustifiable "judicial 
legislation" defies the very nature and purpose of the Constitution. 
The decision in the Ladd case illustrates such a misuse of judicial 
discretion. The court summarily soncluded that "we may change a 
common-law rule of evidence without being guilty of judicial legisla-
tion, and abolish it when we are aware that modem conditions have 
moved beyond it and left it sterile."5 3 In announcing this conclusion, 
the Ladd decision failed to refer to a single case precedent in Pennsyl-
vania indicating that the judiciary has the prerogative to abolish com-
mon law rules of evidence.s 4 
arises from the court's disagreement with the reasoning of the majority opinion of the 
Ladd court 88 to its interpretation of Blackstone and their ultimate conclusion that the 
rule is evidentiary, rather than substantive. rd. at 96 n. 7, 318 A.2d at 260-61 n.7. 
49. 21 Md. App. at 96, :U8 A.2d at 260. 
50. rd. Whether the rule is evidentiary or substantive the courts subscribe to the view that 
alteration of crimina1law, for other than procedural purposes, should be by the legislature. 
rd. at 96, 318 A.2d at 2~1. 
51. 335 P.2d 1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). 
52. Cf. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 616 (1971). Since it is unnecessary to set forth the time of 
death on an indictment for murder or manslaughter, it would appear to be unnecessary to 
plead directly that the victim died within a year and a day. This would lend further 
credence to the belief that the court probably intended to promulgate the common law 
rule 88 substantive in nature. 
53. 402 PR. at 174, 166 A.2d at 507. 
54. In support of its conclusion that evidentiary rules are subject to judicial abolition, the Ladd 
court, quoting from Nesbit v. Riesenman, 298 Pa. 475, 483, 148 A. 695, 697 (1930) stated: 
"The function of determining whether a rule of the common law exists, and what it is, 
lies \IOlely with the court, 88 does also the question whether given conditions offend that 
law." 402 PR. at 174, 166 A.2d at 507. It is suggested that, upon determining what a rule 
is and that it exists, a further rmding that given conditions offend the law does not, in and 
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The Maryland appellate courts have not clearly delineated when a 
common law rule, whether evidentiary or substantive, once adopted in 
Maryland may be abrogated or amended. The Buchanan court indicated 
that the common law consisted of a system of principles not capable of 
expansion. This system was to have perpetual existence, which would 
apply to whatever particular matter or circumstances might arise and 
come within it.5 5 Subsequent courts have abandoned such a rigid 
attitude. On occasion the courts have held that "the common law is not 
static but adapts itself to changing conditions and increasing knowl-
edge.,,56 The courts may implement change via abrogation, revision or 
amendment.5 7 On infrequent occasions the judiciary has exercised its 
discretionary powers, but only in civil cases.5 IS There is no judicial 
precedent in Maryland authorizing abrogation of, revision or amend-
ment to, a substantive element of the criminal common law.s 9 
The Brown court alluded to the existence of judicial authority to 
alter or abrogate a common law rule. "[U]nless changed by legislative 
enactment or judicial decision,,,60 the inhabitants of Maryland are 
entitled to the Maryland common law. The cases cited by the Brown 
court fail, however, to support the proposition that criminal common 
law rules can be changed by judicial decision.6 1 Subsequent to this 
early observation, the court made no further reference to judicial 
prerogative for the abolition of the common law. 
The Brown court's decision not to invoke judicial discretion is 
defensible. In criminal law, where punishment by confinement exists, 
the constitutional rights guaranteed to the offender demand the highest 
protection. The only proper forum for any abolition or alteration of a 
viable law belongs to the legislature. The Brown court ascribed to this 
view: 
When a court is abolishing a rule of law, it is submitted that 
the proper exercise of judicial power should be explained and 
supported by broad policies concerning the criminal law rather 
than narrow determinations resting on very technical bases. The 
aim and purpose of the criminal law is to provide adequate 
protection for society and simultaneously assure justice for the 
of itself, reserve to the judiciary the omnipotent prerogative abolition. Ct. id. at 185-201, 
166 A.2d at 512-20 (dissenting opinion). 
55. 5 Har. & J. 317 (1821); ct. Gilbert v. Findlay College, 195 Md. 508, 74 A.2d 36 (1950). 
56. Md. ex rei. Weaver v. O'Brien, 140 F. Supp. 306, 311 (D. Md. 1956) . 
., 57. Ct. Schneider v. Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
58. See, e.g., Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (1971), citing Schneider v. 
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930). 
59. See notes 60-61 infra. 
60. 21 Md. App. at 92, 318 A.2d at 258. 
61. Of the two criminal cases cited by the court, McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d 
229 (1963) (at common law, burgulary included church as a 'dwelling house') can be 
cited only for the proposition that although occasion for use of the common law had not 
occurred prior to July 4, 1776, such nonuse did not preclude its adoption on that date. 
State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. 317 (1821) serves as the principle case for interpretation of 
the Declaration of Rights. 
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individual accused. A balance between the two requires a deter-
mination which necessarily varies with the environment and 
background of the particular individual making the inquiry. For 
this reason it seems that alteration or modification of the 
criminal law (other than a mere procedural rule) should be by 
the legislature where a more representative determination may 
be made.62 
The Brown court relied upon three precepts in concluding that 
abolition of the rule, if warranted, reposes in the legislature. While the 
court recognized that "major advances have been made in medical 
science and that improvements have been made in scientific crime 
detection,,6 3 it declined to presume on this basis that the rule is no 
longer realistic.6 4 Supportive of this posture the court also noted the 
lower court's refusal to take judicial notice of such changes.65 Sec-
ond, the court considered the possibility that abolition. of the rule 
might result in an imbalance between justice for the accused and the 
adequate protection of society.6 6 Third, the court believed that there 
remains a need to limit causation by some method.6 7 The court's view· 
that the legislative branch of government is the proper forum for 
consideration of the rule does not terminate the issue. It merely shifts 
the problem of resolving the issue to the legislature. Should the legisla-
ture act upon the year and a day rule and, if so, to what extent? 
Various courses of action have been offered for solution and some have 
been implemented by state legislatures. The legislature may adopt the 
common law rule as a conclusive presumption,6 II it may modify the 
rule, expanding the time span of the conclusive presumption,69 or, it 
62. 21 Md. App. at 96, 318 A.2d at 261, quoting from Note, The Abolition of Year and A Day 
Rule: Commonwealth v. Ladd, 65 DICK. L. REv. 166, 169 (1961). The court concluded that 
"because expression and weighing of divergent views, consideration of potential effects, 
and suggestion of adequate safeguards, are better suited to the legislative forum" any 
change should be by the General Assembly. [d. (footnote omitted) 
63. 21 Md. App. at 97, 318 A.2d at 26l. 
64.ld. 
65. The court quoted from the lower court's statement that it was "hesitant to take such judi-
cial notice of a subject which clearly calls for complex expert evidence .... [lIt cannot 
be definitely stated by this Court [Criminal Court of Baltimore J, in the absence of expert 
testimony, that contemporary medical science is capable of establishing causstion after 
the lapse of a year and a day" which evidence the State failed to produce. [d. at 98-99 n.ll, 
318 A.2d at 262 n.ll. 
66. ld. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. See also text at note 62 supra. 
67. [d. 
68. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-458 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2210 (1964); COLO.· 
REV. STAT. § 40-2-9 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:29 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.100 
(1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-27-27 (1960). 
69. CAL PENAL CODE § 194 (West 1969) (three years and a day); REV. CODE WASH. ANN. § 
9.48.110 (1973) (three years and a day). The California court found a Constitutional ques-
tion of the 'retroactivity' of the rule when confronted with the application of the 1969 
legislative amendment which had extended the time span from a year and a day to three 
years and a day, People v. Snipe, 25 Cal. App. 3rd 742, 102 Cal. Rptr. 6 (1972) 
(wherein a chiid died some twenty-one months after the infliction of the mortal wound. At 
the time of the beating, California's PENAL CODE codified the year and a day rule. How-
ever, at the date of the child's death, statutory amendment had increased the rule to three 
years and a day. The court held that because the amendment became effective several 
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may refuse to consider the issue raised by the court and by its silence, 
sanction the rule.7 0 In addition, the legislatures of several states, 
following the early lead of New York,71 have recently prepared and 
adopted new penal laws and codes.72 The intent of these legislatures 
has been to abolish the criminal common law, replacing it with a 
statutory code. These codes purport to be all inclusive by codifying the 
offenses creating, the defenses to, and the sentences for, crimes. As 
witnessed in New York's Legeri and Brengard cases, however, the use of 
a code which attempts to obviate ambiguity may necessitate resort to 
appellate courts for clarification if the code fails to be all-inclusive. 
The Maryland Legislature is provided with an opportunity to join 
those jurisdictions which have adopted a criminal code. The State of 
Maryland Commission on Criminal Law is presently preparing a 
proposed Criminal Code for consideration by the Maryland Legisla-
ture.7 3 To serve as the general model or basis for the proposed Criminal 
Code, the Commissioners selected the New York Penal Law and 
Code.74 Neither the New York Penal Code nor the proposed Maryland 
Code makes reference to the year and a day rule. Unlike the New York 
Penal Code, the proposed Maryland Code abolishes all common law 
offenses.7s Probably through inadvertence, the Commissioners failed to 
consider the year and a day rule.76 However, § 10.05 of the proposed 
Code provides that: 
Undefined words or phrases in this Code, which are used at 
common law or in statutes which are or have been in force in 
this State and which have a judicially determined meaning in 
the context in which they are used in this Code, shall be 
construed in the light of such judicially determined meaning.7 7 
months before the immunity of the prior statute had attached, the increased span in the 
time requirement did not deprive defendants of a vested defense and thus did not con-
travene constitutional prescription against ex post facto laws. 
70. See, e.g., Head v. State, 68 Ga. App. 759, 24 S.E.2d 145 (1943); Elliott v. Mills, 335 P.2d 
1104 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959). 
71. N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1967); see note 31 supra. 
72. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. tit. 538-1 (1972); Code of Ga., tit. 26-1 (1972); ILL. ANN. STA'L, 
Crim. Law and Proc. (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 38, § 1 (1974); OHIO REv. CODE ANN., 
tit. 29, § 2901.01 (1974). A number of these codes have been based upon the NEW YORK 
PENAL LAW AND CODE. In only one code is the year and a day rule mentioned specifically and 
then only by a Note. The defmition of murder is "generally consistent.with the common law 
definition of Murder, but defines the crime in non-technical terms and without adopting 
the common law rule that for guilt the victim had to die within a year and a day from the 
infliction of the fatal wound." Revision Commission Note, chap. 265, § 2, at p. 95 of the 
PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE OF MASSACHUSET1'8 (1972) (effective January I, 1974). 
73. STATE OF MARYLAND COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL LAw: PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE (June I, 
1972) [hereinafter cited as PRoPOSED CRIMINAL CODE). 
74. It should be noted ~t the Commissioners have made use of the MODERN PENAL CODE 
where they have determined that it is more applicable to the 'Maryland situation. PR0-
POSED CRIMINAL CODE at viii. 
75. PRoPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 1.10, at 2. 
76. The Brown decision had not been handed down at the time the proposed code was pub-
lished. 
77. PROPOSED CRIMINAL CODE § 10.05, at 31. 
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Undoubtedly, the Commissioners intend that § 10.05 apply only to 
those terms which appear directly in, but have not been defined by, the 
code. An inaccurate application of § 10.05 coupled with the Brown 
decision may provide some future defendant with an argument that 
legislative caveat has resulted in the validity and viability of the year 
and a day rule. Such an approach by a defendant may necessitate 
consideration and interpretation of the proposed Code by the appellate 
courts ending in a Maryland version of the Legeri and Brengard cases.7 8 
Further appellate deliberation on the year and a day rule need not 
occur. The Commissioners and the Legislature have an opportunity to 
'rectify the problem prior to adoption of the proposed Code. They may 
follow the lead of the Massachusetts Legislature and by Commentary 
declare that the year and a day rule is no longer applicable in Mary-
land.7 9 While Commentary is expressive legislative intent, it is not law 
and appellate debate may still ensue should a defendant raise the issue. 
Therefore, should the Commissioners and the Legislature determine 
that the correct conclusion is complete abolition of the rule with guilt 
to be ascertained solely through a causal relationship, that position 
should be so codified. 
As an alternative, the Legislature may, as implied by the Brown 
COurt,8 0 determine that abolition is not warranted. If this approach is 
adopted by the Legislature, the year and a day rule should be codified 
to prevent resort to the appellate courts at a future date. 
A third and more viable posture exists, which takes into account the 
medical advances made in the 20th century, the protection of society, 
and the accused's constitutional rights. The Legislature could expressly 
enact a section which sanctions the rule that if the injured party does 
not die within, for example three years and a day after the infliction of 
the injury there is a rebuttable presumption that the infliction of the 
injury was not the cause of death.81 The prosecution would still have 
the burden of proving causation beyond a reasonable doubt. It is 
unlikely that institution of a three-year rebuttable presumption would 
place any greater obstacles in the prosecution's path when proving 
causation. The approach would leave adjudication of causation to the 
trier of the facts while reminding him that, if the injury did no~ result 
in death within three years and a day, the presumption arises, which the 
prosecution must overcome, that the decedent did not die of that 
injury. 
LucyA. Lowe 
78. It should be noted that Marylljnd has no prior statutes incorporating the year and a day 
rule. The New York courts relied heavily upon prior incorporation of the rule in the case 
of murder by poison and the subsequent abolition by the legislature of that statute. The 
Maryland courts will not be able to avail themselves of such reasoning should a version 
of the Legeri and Brengard cases appear in this State. See note 31 supra. 
79. See note 72 supra. 
SO. See notes 63-67 supra. 
81. The use of three years and a day is merely for illustrative purposes. A proper period of 
limitation can only be ascertained after a thorough analysis by the legislature of medical 
and scientific advancements. 
